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In this article, we outline the multifaceted roles played by non-state actors within
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and place this
within the wider landscape of global climate governance. In doing so, we look at
both the formation and aftermath of the 2015 Paris Agreement. We argue that
the Paris Agreement cements an architecture of hybrid multilateralism that
enables and constrains non-state actor participation in global climate gover-
nance. We ﬂesh out the constitutive features of hybrid multilateralism, enumer-
ate the multiple positions non-state actors may employ under these conditions,
and contend that non-state actors will play an increasingly important role in the
post-Paris era. To substantiate these claims, we assess these shifts and ask how
non-state actors may affect the legitimacy, justice, and effectiveness of the Paris
Agreement. © 2017 The Authors. WIREs Climate Change published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
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INTRODUCTION
The Paris Agreement now stands at the center ofefforts by the international community to address
the threats associated with climatic change. Within this
Agreement—built upon the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)—non-state
actors will play an increasingly important role. The pres-
ence and prominence of non-state actors within the Paris
Agreement mirrors a broader shift across the interna-
tional climate governance landscape in which nongo-
vernmental organizations (NGOs), business groups,
think tanks, trade unions, private governance arrange-
ments, transnational networks, and substate authorities
assume active roles in limiting the negative effects of
global warming.1,2 This conceptualization of non-state
actors includes civil society, business, research groups,
and substate authorities. We prefer this expansive deﬁni-
tion as it ﬁts alongside the deﬁnition of nonparty stake-
holders employed by the UNFCCC (see also Ref 3).
In this article, we focus on how the Paris Agree-
ment further deepens and complicates the connections
between multilateralism and non-state action. It does
so by creating an architecture that we call ‘hybrid
multilateralism’ that splices together state and non-
state actors (on the usage of this term, see Ref 4). This
hybrid arrangement emerges in the Paris Agreement
through the adoption of two different governance
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traits: state-led action deﬁned and stipulated by the
parties through their own nationally determined con-
tributions (NDCs) as well as efforts by the UNFCCC
to orchestrate transnational climate efforts. In both
instances, non-state actors are formally and infor-
mally woven into the Paris Agreement performing a
range of different and increasingly important func-
tions. Non-state actors will act as watchdogs of the
NDCs enhancing transparency, facilitating the stock-
takes, and pressuring for the ratcheting up of NDCs
every 5 years. Likewise non-state actors will act as
contributors and governing partners through orches-
tration as they are encouraged by the Agreement ‘to
scale up their climate actions, and [register] those
actions in the Non-State Actor Zone for Climate
Action platform’.5 This process is coalesced further
under the Global Climate Action Agenda (GCAA).6
These hybridized governance traits complicate—
perhaps even render superﬂuous—traditional catego-
rizations of ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ initiatives
commonplace in the literature and policy practice.
The review proceeds as follows. We commence
by outlining the differential roles non-state actors
play in the polycentric system of global climate gov-
ernance and link this to the UNFCCC speciﬁcally.
Next, we discuss how non-state actors contributed to
the formation of the Paris Agreement. We argue that
the Paris Agreement establishes a hybrid architecture
that amends previous roles and creates new opportu-
nities for non-state actors vis-á-vis states. We ﬂesh
out the implications of this complex hybrid architec-
ture by evaluating how non-state actors will contrib-
ute to justice, legitimacy, and effectiveness of the
Agreement moving forward. These, in our view, are
three key outcomes of state–non-state interaction,
and they have each generated signiﬁcant academic
debate (on the importance of these criteria for func-
tioning governance systems, see Ref 7; In terms of cli-
mate governance see Ref 8). We do so by
highlighting three dimensions within each criterion to
home in on relevant bodies of scholarship within
each of them. For justice, we probe how non-state
actors generate agency, gain access, and alter alloca-
tions. In terms of legitimacy, we focus on how non-
state actors promote participation, strengthen repre-
sentation, and foster accountability. Finally, we look
at how non-state actors can enhance the effectiveness
of the Paris Agreement by enhancing transparency,
augmenting compliance, and affecting outcomes.
These dimensions enable us to unpack how non-state
actor participation will be structured, facilitated, and
(possibly) hampered as efforts are made to secure the
broad goals of the Paris Agreement. While taking
stock of pre-Paris literature, we also offer the ﬁrst
‘meta-review’ of the post-Paris literature that has
burgeoned over the past year in our discussion of jus-
tice, legitimacy, and effectiveness.
GLOBAL (CLIMATE) GOVERNANCE,
THE UNFCCC, AND NON-STATE
ACTORS
International politics is bewilderingly complex.9
Although this is true of most issue areas,10 it is an
especially apt descriptor of global climate gover-
nance, which today operates as a dense regime com-
plex populated by states, international organizations
(IOs), and non-state actors.11,12 Although states and
IOs have long been established features of interna-
tional affairs, it is only in the post-Cold War era that
we have seen a noticeable rise in terms of the number
and inﬂuence of non-state actors.13 Accordingly,
these agents have begun playing different roles in
how governance beyond the state unfolds, especially
in the climate realm. To elucidate the general roles of
non-state actors in the lead-up to the Paris Agree-
ment, we highlight how these agents have emerged
as: co-contributors within formal multilateral negoti-
ations; conductors and players in different orchestra-
tion efforts; partners in transnational networks;
private governors; and outside protesters.
First, non-state actors now routinely seek to
gain access to formal multilateral negotiations and
IO activities.14 Over the past 20 years in particular,
we have seen a sharp increase in efforts by non-state
actors to insert themselves in different stages of IO
policy cycles such as agenda-setting/policy formula-
tion, decision-making, implementation, as well as the
monitoring and enforcement of agreements.14,15
Within the ﬁeld of climate governance, non-state
actors have been increasingly active within the
UNFCCC,16 the Convention on Biological Diversity,
and climate clubs such as the Renewable Energy and
Energy Efﬁciency Partnership (REEEP), REN 21, and
Asia-Paciﬁc Partnership on Clean Development and
Climate (APP; on the theoretical importance of clubs,
see Ref 17 and for an empirical evaluation of clubs
in the lead up to Paris, see Ref 18).
Second, states and IOs have begun shifting their
mode of governance from regulation to orchestra-
tion: attempts by multilateral actors to steer the
efforts of other state and non-state actors through
soft power.19,20 Although prevalent across issue
spaces, the utility of this concept of orchestration
was borne out in the lead up to Paris. For example,
the United Nations Secretary General (UNSG) orga-
nized the 2014 Climate Summit in the lead up to the
Lima COP to mobilize non-state commitments21 and
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the 2012 High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable
Development has been discussed as an orchestration
effort.22 Moreover global cities are increasingly
brought within orchestration efforts by the UNFCCC
and the World Bank.23 For an analysis of orchestra-
tion within climate governance—notably in terms of
aviation regulation—see Ref 24.
Third, non-state actors have been centrally
involved in climate governance in the form of transna-
tional networks, epistemic communities, public–private
partnerships (PPPs), and multi-stakeholder partnerships
(on epistemic communities, see Ref 26 and on PPPs and
multi-stakeholder efforts, see Ref 27). The number of
networks involved in UNFCCC activities has continued
to rise over the past two decades.
Fourth, non-state actors have increasingly taken
it upon themselves to become governors in climate
politics. These private governance arrangements usu-
ally take the form of certiﬁcation schemes and/or
global standard-setting. The empirical uptick in pri-
vate governance is most evident in the sub-ﬁelds of
forest and marine sustainability as enacted by the
Forest Stewardship Council and the Marine Steward-
ship Council.28,29 These efforts at private governor-
ship can often be explained in terms of a ‘supply’
and ‘demand’ model as private rules are adopted
(and diffuse) across the climate regime complex as
private actors seek to ﬁll governance gaps. 30
Finally, non-state (civil society) actors are often
engaged in activist efforts. This most frequently takes
the form of rallies and actions, intended to gain inﬂu-
ence through media attention and by disrupting ‘poli-
tics as usual’.31 Although protests are common in
transnational politics, they have a central place in cli-
mate governance as we saw at the Copenhagen COP
in 2009 in which civil society turned out en masse to
contest the exclusionary practices of negotiations.
On December 12, 2009, some 100,000 participants
publically resisted the disenfranchisement of certain
perspectives in negotiations.32 The importance of
protests continued in the run up to Paris with hun-
dreds of thousands of individuals taking part in
Global Climate Marches.33 Due to the attacks in
Paris preceding the COP, protests were banned dur-
ing the 2 weeks of negotiations.34 Nevertheless, ‘Peo-
ples Marches’ for climate change continue to be
organized as we enter the post-Paris period.35
Non-state Actors in the UNFCCC
Before discussing the emergence of the Paris Agreement
and its hybrid architecture in more depth, we will focus
our review on the role of non-state actors within the
UNFCCC. We do so by discussing how non-state actors
contribute to party delegations, through the constituency
system, and through the organization of side events.
Party Delegations
There is no formal rule as to the size or makeup of a
party delegation. Practice varies widely, and mostly
mirrors the relative wealth and concern for climate
change of the respective country. Delegation size has
ranged from under a handful (e.g., some African
countries) to over a thousand members (e.g., Brazil,
US). The resulting capacity gap limits poor countries’
negotiating power and makes their participation in
each of the many sessions typically running in parallel
less effective. The makeup of a delegation is also var-
ied, with some countries sending particularly large
representations from business associations (Brazil),
local government, and youth (Canada) or science and
academia (Russia). There is also a noteworthy
increase in the number of non-state members in devel-
oping country delegations in the past decade or so
(e.g., Gabon and Guyana).36 At COP17 in 2011, for
example, some 70% of delegations included at least
one non-state actor representative and 18% of delega-
tions were non-state representatives.37 The propor-
tion of women in national delegations has been found
to experience a modest but consistent growth, albeit
varying strongly across countries. It tends to be higher
in countries that enjoy a higher level of development
and a higher degree of political gender equality.38
However, the participation of non-state actors
in the negotiations can also be hampered or facilitated
by informal practices.39 States hold the right to close
the door to meetings at the COP. A common explana-
tion in the literature has been the functional efﬁciency
hypothesis, where states only allow participation
when it suits their interest and in particular during the
agenda setting stage, while restricting in the more sen-
sitive decision-making stages. When examining the
practices under which circumstances non-state actors
are allowed to participate, Nasiritousi and Linnér13
concluded that this hypothesis only partly holds as
explanation why some sessions are open to observers
while others are held behind closed doors. They found
that decisions on whether to open or close the door
are inﬂuenced by standard operating practices, habits,
and routines. In addition, ‘states strategically seek to
inﬂuence decisions on open/closed meetings depend-
ing on their individual political preferences on partic-
ular issues’.16 States can actively use lobbying
non-state actors to strengthen their own policy prefer-
ences. After the overview of observer organizations,
the SBI encouraged an opening up and greater
involvement of observers at these COP meetings.
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Constituency System
To attend the COPs and intersessionals, non-state
actors—if not on a party delegation—must be accre-
dited with the UNFCCC. At the Paris climate negoti-
ations, 1109 NGOs descended on Le Bourget
bringing over 8000 individual participants.40 Of the
30,000 actors who attended COP21, around one
third were accredited as NGO or media observers.40
When gaining accreditation, NGOs are asked to join
one of nine existing constituency groups. These are
the business and industry NGOs and environmental
NGOs; local government and municipal authorities;
the research and independent NGOs; trade union
NGOs; Women and Gender; Youth NGOs; and
farmers and agricultural NGOs (Farmers) (which
currently still await full accreditation).
The ability of NGOs to attend the COPs and
intersessionals—and therefore access different stages of
the policy cycle such as agenda setting, policy formula-
tion, and decision-making—requires accreditation. The
importance of the constituency and accreditation system
will persist into the post-Paris period. As attendance
numbers have varied widely over the past 10 years—
rising at Copenhagen, Lima, and Paris—it seems likely
that rising attendance will coincide with new submis-
sions of NDCs (2020, 2025, 2030) and global stock-
takes (2023, 2028, 2033) as they offer most scope for
NGO impact.
Side Events and Exhibition Booths
The COPs and Intersessionals are comprised of formal
sessions and what is typically referred to as ‘side
events.’ The latter take place alongside the formal nego-
tiations and are coordinated by the UNFCCC. Both
national and observer delegations can apply to hold a
side event. Typically, they highlight diverse climate
change-related issues and are held in the form of panel
discussions. Competition can be ﬁerce. For example, at
COP 16 in 2010, 249 side events were held and about
400 applications were submitted.41 While there are sev-
eral types of non-state engagements, the ofﬁcial UN side
events at the COPs are possibly the most prominent.
They provide a forum for interaction among national
delegates, intergovernmental and observer organization
representatives, and the media. They are considered by
non-state actors to be an avenue for exerting inﬂuence
on the negotiations.42 A small set of side events is cov-
ered daily by a publication called the Earth Negotia-
tions Bulletin on the Side, a service provided by the
International Institute of Sustainable Development, usu-
ally at a cost, giving them extra visibility.43 Likewise,
non-state actors can apply to organize and run an exhi-
bition booth. These are housed within the conference
center and offer a chance for groups to showcase their
actions and achievements and draw attention to diver-
gent topics. Both side events and exhibition booths are
applied for through the ‘Side Events and Exhibits
Online Registration System,’ and must be approved by
an accredited organization with the UNFCCC.
NON-STATE ACTORS AND THE PARIS
AGREEMENT: A HYBRID
ARCHITECTURE
The Lead-up to Paris
The 1992 UNFCCC treaty text makes no reference
to either non-state actors or observer organizations.
Perhaps it indirectly acknowledged the role of scien-
tists to determine the threshold toward ‘dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system.’
In the main, however, observer organization input
into the UNFCCC was ﬁrst discussed just prior to
the Kyoto Conference.44 The Kyoto Protocol makes
reference of nongovernmental bodies (Article 13).
Already at COP3, nonparty participants outnum-
bered Party delegates. The UNFCCC originally fol-
lowed the so-called convention-protocol approach45
spearheaded by the ozone regime with little to no for-
mal recognition of non-state actors.
Up until COP15 in Copenhagen, states had tried
to negotiate a successor to the Kyoto Protocol that
would similarly rest upon a set of top-down targets and
timetables. After the stalemate of Copenhagen, the par-
ticipation of non-state actors in the climate negotiations
was far from certain. Some parties questioned the value
of inviting observer organization. The UNFCCC initi-
ated a review process of their participation.16 Yet, out
of the reevaluation of international climate regime also
grew a heightened interest in new transnational initia-
tives, where non-state and substate actors were vital to
spur novel forms of climate actions and to rejuvenate
the UNFCCC agenda.4 The number and type of non-
state actors involved in international governance
expanded signiﬁcantly in the period between Copenha-
gen and Paris. The UN negotiations involved an
increasing variety of NGOs, trade unions, business,
women’s and youth organizations, cities and regions,
indigenous people communities and different religious
groups. These groups assumed a wide range of roles,
from idea providers to implementers, from knowledge
brokers to watchdogs, from lobbyist to representing
marginal voices. As their mandates and importance
grew, so did their potentiality for authority in the inter-
national climate politics.30,46,47
At the same time, however, gridlock in Copen-
hagen meant that states began increasingly looking
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for a way to build ﬂexibility into a treaty as a means
to promote agreement and compliance. A commonly
demanded alternative was to shift toward some form
of minilateralism (see for instance Ref 48 and for an
expanded version see Ref 49): limiting the number of
negotiating states to make agreement on climate
change more tractable in ways sensitive to the recog-
nition that climate change is a (super) wicked prob-
lem.50 So prominent became this logic that, at one
point, David Roberts argued that minilateralism was
the ‘conventional wisdom’ for addressing climate
change in developed countries.51
Although the precise proposal varied between
advocates, three different (though overlapping) logics
underpin this move. First, an increased bargaining
efﬁciency argument suggests that by reducing the
number of negotiating states to those most capable of
reducing global emissions, this would supposedly cre-
ate more preference-overlap between negotiating
states and thus foster agreement. Second, a club-based
model suggests that a smaller group could craft rules
and incentives to encourage climate action and reduce
the risk that a small set of oppositional countries can
veto a decision. Finally, a legitimacy-based claim
emerged that a small group of responsible (in both
senses of the word) actors should take the lead on cli-
mate action in ways that recognize both the complic-
ity and importance of having major powers engaged
in efforts to avert global climate disasters (for an
excellent summary of these positions and the relevant
proponents of each see Ref 52). Although often
unsaid, these minilateral proposals would have
restricted non-state actors to formal negotiations in
hopes of securing agreement faster. However, among
UNFCCC participants in general, the minilateral
approaches never gained traction as legitimate
replacements of the globally focused multilateral
negotiations.53
Ultimately, then, minilateralism is not the route
adopted by the international community (for an
assessment of the direction taken from a minilateral-
ist point of view see Ref 54). The Paris Agreement
instead opted for what we describe here as a hybrid
model: displacing top-down and bottom-up efforts, it
rests upon inclusion and voluntary commitments of
all states with myriad roles for non-state actors. By
the start of the Paris conference 181 parties had stip-
ulated their intended NDCs with a following seven
documented during the fortnight of COP21. With
these commitments, the Paris Agreement needed only
to formalize these positions and use them as a plat-
form for future engagement on mitigation, adapta-
tion, and ﬁnance. Despite some last minute hiccups
in negotiation, an Agreement was eventually reached
and, on November 4, 2016, the Paris Agreement
entered into force when 55 countries representing at
least 55% of carbon emissions ratiﬁed the treaty (for
a discussion on the path to Paris see Ref 34). Donald
Trump, who has now withdrawn the US from the
Paris Agreement, was elected President the day after
(on the potential beneﬁts of a US withdrawal, see Ref
55). The showcasing of the many non-state initia-
tives, such as the under 2C coalition of regions, cit-
ies and companies encompassing about a third of the
global emissions, together with China’s declaration
of taking the leadership helm, became emblematic for
the resolve to stick to the Paris Agreement.
A Hybrid Agreement
What shape did the Paris Agreement take, and how
does it relate to multilateralism and non-state actors?
The emerging literature on the Paris Agreement uses
similar nomenclature to describe how the key ele-
ments ﬁt together into a comprehensible whole.
Johan Rockström et al. suggest that ‘the hybrid
make-up of the PA is the result of pragmatic political
design’.56 Harro van Asselt et al. argue that ‘the
hybrid model of international climate policy embod-
ied in the Paris Agreement requires countries to
deliver their NDCs and to progressively increase col-
lective and individual efforts over time.’57 Similarly
Dan Bodansky and Elliot Diringer noted in the lead
up to Paris that the Durban platform, combined with
policy shifts at the Lima and Warsaw COPs, meant
that a hybrid model would ensue at Paris.58 Radoslav
Dimitrov argues that the Paris Agreement ‘is a hybrid
that enshrines both bottom-up and top-down
approaches to global climate governance.’59 Michele
Stua characterizes the Paris Agreement as a ‘hybrid,
holistic, harmonized’ model of multilevel climate gov-
ernance for the supply, demand, and exchange of
mitigation outcomes.60 Finally, Karin Bäckstrand
et al. describe the Paris Agreement in terms of a
hybrid architecture.61 While there seems to be con-
vergence on this language, precisely what is ‘hybrid’
about the Agreement remains underspeciﬁed. In
order to provide conceptual precision for the litera-
ture and undertake a critical review of the promises
and pitfall of the Agreement moving forward, we dis-
cuss how the Agreement is a hybrid architecture in
light of non-state actors (Box 1).
Beyond Top-Down and Bottom-Up: NDCs
and Non-state Actors
We suggest that the Paris Agreement is a hybrid of
state and non-state action, exempliﬁed and solidiﬁed
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through NDCs and orchestration. This shift unsettles
categorizations of top-down and bottom-up activity,
as well as issues of legality, voluntarism, and other
established concepts in climate governance. Generally
speaking, top-down refers to the relative authority of
the actors who seek to produce an intended outcome.
The more centrally located to the authoritative
power, the closer to the top. The concept of top-
down in the Kyoto Protocol context often referred to
the decisions which should be implemented through
command and control. Alternately, bottom-up imple-
mentation refers to action originating from the target
groups intended to implement the policy. Policy deci-
sion, either through statutes, executive orders, or
court decisions at both nation-state and substate
level, should spur implementation of the general
goals of the agreement, in addition to company poli-
cies and other non-state initiatives. In the UNFCCC
bottom-up draws attention to the usage of voluntary
contributions to implement the Protocol or the
Framework Convention. Top-down and bottom-up
then implies a hierarchical relationship in terms of
actions initiated by actors with relative decision-
making authority, and does not refer speciﬁcally to
modes of decision making (legal, non-binding etc.).62
As the locus of authority is changing in the post-Paris
climate governance, the top-down/bottom-up distinc-
tion becomes harder to establish.
In large measure, this is because the Paris
Agreement consolidates the bottom-up approach to
target setting that emerged in the aftermath of
Copenhagen, where developed countries agreed to
provide national mitigation pledges. These pledges
are not legally binding, but the framework for moni-
toring them does have this status.63 This process
entails several commitments. First, in 2018, there will
be a facilitative dialogue on mitigation. Second,
according to Article 4.9 of the Paris Agreement, from
2020 a new or updated NDC will be required that
outlines commitments for the next period. These
must be renewed every 5 years, and according to
Article 4.3, each submission must build upon the pre-
vious to reﬂect the individual state’s ‘highest possible
ambition, reﬂecting its common but differentiated
responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light
of different national circumstances’. Finally, building
on the facilitative dialogue in 2018, from 2023
onward every 5 years there will be a global stocktake
on mitigation, adaptation, and ﬁnance. This
stocktaking—enshrined in Article 14—is designed to
track progress of NDC implementation.3
In addition to these formal procedures, Article
13 also formulates a ‘transparency framework’ build-
ing supposedly on the Kyoto Protocol’s model. This
framework is supposed to ensure that states begin
harmonizing the formulation of their NDCs through
the usage of similar metrics and with a common for-
mat. The details of this Framework will be negotiated
in 2018.64 Both the transparency framework and the
global stocktake will engage non-state actors directly.
This will most likely take the form of non-state
actors engaging in monitoring, review, and veriﬁca-
tion (MRV) of state NDCs, and feeding this informa-
tion in to the global stocktake process as well as the
compliance mechanism (Article 15).65,66 Especially
concerning the NDCs of Least Developed
Countries—who may lack the means of costly
MRV—non-state actors will prove vital.
Although NDCs combine top-down and
bottom-up practices in some ways, this binary dis-
tinction is not very helpful for understanding the
hybridity of international climate governance after
Paris. As noted above, legal bindingness is not
restricted to top-down governance and bottom-up
with voluntarism. After the Trump administration’s
announcement to withdraw the US as a Party to the
Paris Agreement, states such as Hawaii, California,
and Colorado, and cities, such as New York, Los
Angeles, Atlanta, Salt Lake City, and Pittsburgh,
BOX 1
EXPLAINING THE EMERGENCE OF THE
HYBRID ARCHITECTURE
Although we focus on assessing the justice, legiti-
macy, and effectiveness of the Paris Agreement
with respect to non-state actors, it will be equally
important for scholars to explain why this model
was chosen and how it was enacted. This will
likely entail both qualitative work (archival, inter-
views) and quantitative analysis to explain state
preferences. This work should also focus on
explaining how non-state actors mattered in
bringing this situation to fruition by inserting
themselves in policy processes, keeping global
warming high on the international agenda, and
lobbying domestic governments to work on inter-
governmental relations between the COPs (for an
initial analysis on the importance of non-state
actors in the formation of the Paris Agreement
see Michael Jacobs work on civil society pres-
sure72 and on the importance of domestic prefer-
ences in shaping international climate action see
the recent special by Charles Roger, Thomas Hale
and Liliana Andonova73 and the associated spe-
cial issue contributions).
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have through executive order or other decisions
decided to commit to the Paris Agreement. Even if
these commitments are still unfolding, many of them
may be seen as legally binding bottom-up initiatives
contributing to the Paris Agreement.
The UNFCCC and Orchestration
Beyond the merging of top-down and bottom-up—
and legal bindingness alongside voluntary contribu-
tions with the NDCs—the Paris Agreement is also
hybrid in terms UNFCCC orchestration and non-
state actor engagement.67 The basic premise under-
pinning orchestration is that states and IOs—lacking
hard-and-fast means of securing compliance—seek to
mobilize or even catalyze the efforts of third parties
in pursuit of some governance goal. This is typically
cashed out in terms of an orchestrator-intermediary-
target model: orchestrators enlist intermediary third
parties to impact targets in pursuit of some gover-
nance goal. Orchestration therefore moves away
from principal-agent models of governance and
instead relies upon the provision of material or idea-
tional resources as a means of moving
intermediaries—and ultimately targets—toward par-
ticular actions and goals. For instance, Hale and
Roger discuss how both states and IOs can orches-
trate sub- and non-state action. The World Bank, to
take one case, orchestrated the Global Gas Flaring
Reduction Partnership that sets out a number of rules
that oil companies and other concerned actors should
adopt. This initiative engaged a number of
intermediaries—state governments, oil companies,
non-state watchdogs, and other IO bureaucracies—
and pushed these actors to alter their own or other
target behavior (Box 2).68
Orchestration in the UNFCCC is most clearly
exempliﬁed by the Lima-Paris Action Agenda
(LPAA) and the related Non-State Actor Zone for
Climate Action (NAZCA) Portal. Both of these initia-
tives were launched by a quartet of actors: the Peru-
vian Presidency at COP20, the French Presidency of
COP21, the Executive Ofﬁce of the United Nation
Secretary-General, and the UNFCCC Secretariat.
Since that time, at Marrakech, the LPAA is being
rebranded as the GCAA. LPAA, or now the GCAA,
was framed as the ‘fourth pillar’ of the Paris Agree-
ment (alongside national pledges, the ﬁnancing pack-
age, and the negotiated agreement). It showcases
non-state climate action across 12 thematic ﬁelds.
NAZCA, in a different vein, is an open portal
through which non-state actors can pledge their own
contribution to emission reduction, adaptation
efforts, etc. NAZCA and LPAA are also facilitated
by the appointment of two high-level champions—
Laurence Tubiana, French Ambassador for climate
change and Ms. Hakima El Haite, Minister Delegate
to the Minister of Energy, Mining, Water and Envi-
ronment of Morocco—who will oversee non-state
efforts between 2016 and 2020.
The Paris Agreement solidiﬁes the UNFCCC as
orchestrator of the transnational (non-state) actors. It
does so by mandating the continuation of NAZCA
(para. 118), the new GCAA (para. 117), and the
high-level champions (para. 122). Since Marrakesh,
there has been a concerted shift by the High-Level
Champions to consolidate these orchestration efforts
under the NAZCA and especially GCAA label. This
has entailed releasing a ‘Roadmap for Global Cli-
mate Action,’ showcasing non-state efforts, and call-
ing for non-state actor contributions in the
aforementioned Roadmap. For instance, at the Mar-
rakesh COP in 2017, the High-Level Champions
hosted an event designed to discuss the role of non-
state actors in monitoring and tracking NDCs, con-
tributing to technical expert meetings, and participat-
ing in mitigation/adaptation efforts.69
Yet these efforts to orchestrate non-state
actors come with their own set of complications.
Even though nonparty stakeholders are invited to
scale-up their commitments, how will these efforts
BOX 2
THE ROOTS AND RELEVANCE OF
ORCHESTRATION
Orchestration has become a key concept in the
governance of climate change. It is worth not-
ing that orchestration efforts seen in Paris have
their roots in the review that the Subsidiary
Body of Implementation (SBI) requested after
Copenhagen on the future role of observer
organizations in the negotiations. While the
admittance of the number of observer partici-
pants was restricted, the number of organiza-
tions continued to rise. The report concluded
that the Chairs at the different sessions and
negotiation strands should ‘make greater use
of observer input’25 (para 23). To this end their
participation at the COPs should be facilitated,
for example, by host countries ﬁnding suitable
venues and Parties were encouraged ‘to further
engage stakeholders at the national level,
including information dissemination and con-
sultation’ (para 23).
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be related to NDCs? Who will be responsible for
measuring non-state commitments and ensuring
their implementation? Will the high-level champions
be neutral promoters of non-state climate action, or
partisan actors with their own agenda? The hybrid
architecture thus complicates the relationship
between multilateralism—states and the UNFCCC
Secretariat—and transnational non-state actors.70
NON-STATE ACTORS IN THE POST-
PARIS ERA: JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY,
AND EFFECTIVENESS
This architecture of the Paris Agreement will have a
major bearing upon the ability of states and non-state
actors to tackle the demands wrought by global
warming. In order to think about how this hybrid
architecture may work in practice, we focus on asses-
sing how non-state actors may contribute in terms of
justice, legitimacy, and effectiveness. These are impor-
tant topics that the post-Paris literature has begun
assessing, albeit unsystematically (on the importance
of pledge-and-review in a post-Paris context see Ref
71). We discuss these three features, note connections
between them, and conclude by suggesting that non-
state actors will need to play many diverse roles if the
Paris Agreement will approach its lofty aspirations.
Justice
The hybrid multilateral characteristic of non-state
actor engagement in the UNFCCC under the Paris
Agreement continues to pose questions of justice and
equity when it comes to deciding who gets what,
when, and how. Sites of climate governance are
crowded, highly contested, and often disjointed from
one another, in particular across multiple levels of
governance.74 This has led to conﬂict between global
goals and on-the-ground realities, which is also played
out between global justice discourses and local percep-
tions of justice.75 Unless the root causes of ongoing
inequality between the haves and have-nots, and the
developed and developing worlds, are addressed, cli-
mate governance post-Paris will continue to result in
harm done and in violations to the human rights of
local communities.76,77 How such matters of justice
are dealt with (or not) will be a crucial determinant of
the effectiveness of the post-Paris climate regime,
according to Chuks Okereke and Philip Coventry.78
While references to climate justice, human rights and
equity are included in the Paris Agreement’s preamble,
they are not elaborated on in its substantive provi-
sions.5 Addressing such issues is important not only
because it is relevant to those who will be most
affected by climate change, but also because justice
analysis is essential for understanding the dynamics
behind political claims, actions, and trade-offs.79 In
this section, we elaborate on key elements of agency,
access and allocation in relation to justice post-Paris.
Agency
Agency is concerned with who makes decisions on
behalf of whom (e.g., Refs 13,80). It is widely
acknowledged that climate governance no longer rests
solely with states, if it ever has.78 Hierarchical forms
of governance have been replaced with a more com-
plex polycentrist and plurilateralist world ‘order’ as
non-state actors play increasingly visible and inﬂuen-
tial roles and top-down/bottom-up modalities are sub-
verted (e.g., Refs 81,82). However, procedural
injustices over inadequately representing the views and
voices of the (adversely) affected remain a major short-
coming in climate governance, as noted in the
section on legitimacy. Many have documented the
ways in which reducing emissions from deforestation
and forest degradation in developing countries (REDD
+) projects have been designed and implemented with-
out due involvement of local stakeholders (e.g., Refs
83–85). This also plays out in the (still) limited partici-
pation of observer organizations, in particular of the
marginalized, during COP proceedings.77 Many argue
that civil society participation must continue to be
improved if the democratic legitimacy of environmen-
tal governance is to be strengthened.78
The role and status of observer organizations in
the UNFCCC have indeed changed over the years.
The Paris Agreement dedicates one of six sections of
its preambular text to nonparty stakeholders. The ver-
dict may still be out with regard to the optimal level
of non-state participation in intergovernmental cli-
mate proceedings post-Paris. Questions, such as to
what extent too much civil society participation might
contribute to paralysis of negotiations (and a threat to
national sovereignty)37 and whether non-state actors
under this system are able to inﬂuence decisions more
than minimally,86 in particular when the policy out-
comes affect them directly, are still debated.
Formal interaction and discussion between
national delegations and observer organizations have
in the past not been directly facilitated by the
UNFCCC beyond perhaps constituencies making
statements in the high-level segment of each COP
and special meetings for party-observer exchanges
hosted by the UNFCCC Secretariat. This can happen
through side events, thematic days and exhibit
spaces; yet, effective channels for bringing alternative
discourses, such as on justice and the rights of
Mother Earth, to the negotiating tables have been
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limited.43 Although such discourses might surface in
informal discussions such as the side events, dis-
courses of market-based ecological modernization87
and technocratic rationalization74 remain dominant
in the UNFCCC. Perhaps the ‘Multi-stakeholder
Dialogue—Local Communities and Indigenous Peo-
ples.’ held during SB46 in May 2017, is a departure
from this. It is the ﬁrst UNFCCC meeting cochaired
between a party delegate and an observer representa-
tive and driven by the desire of Indigenous Peoples to
enhance their status from just observer to being
granted decision-making rights (similar to Article
5 under the CBD perhaps). Discussions included
comments acknowledging Indigenous Peoples not
only as stakeholders but as ‘right holders’ and the
need to enhance interconnectedness between different
knowledge systems (author’s observation and notes
from on-site participation).
Access
Next we discuss access, in particular just (or unjust)
access to beneﬁts and rights.80 The Paris Agreement,
like other UNFCCC decisions, is driven by techno-
cratic and market-oriented rationales that serve to
produce economic efﬁciencies and market-driven eco-
logical modernization. This paradigm is unsympa-
thetic to alternative approaches, knowledge, values,
and experiences,88 thus erecting further barriers for
indigenous groups, for example, to access their bene-
ﬁts and rights under the UNFCCC.89 Indigenous peo-
ples, with the help of NGOs, succeeded in their
outcry during COP14 in Poznan in 2008 against hav-
ing the plural of peoples dropped from negotiating
texts. Its subsequent reinstatement acknowledged
their status as peoples who share collective rights and
responsibilities under the UN General Assembly reso-
lution on the United Nations Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples. These collective rights
are legally and normatively distinct from individual
rights as they reﬂect different social, custodial and
kinship obligations of indigenous peoples.77
While the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol had
made no mention of any marginalized or vulnerable
subgroups, referring merely to the vulnerability of
states, such as small-island states or Least Developed
Countries, the Paris Agreement does make multiple
references to such groups deepening the emergence of
a hybrid arrangement. Formal acknowledgment of
such rights and beneﬁts comes with no guarantee they
are always translated into action, however. The
REDD+ safeguard provisions are a case in point. They
were adopted to ensure that REDD+ activities do no
harm to people or the environment. Safeguards that
should be promoted and supported when undertaking
REDD+ activities include the recognition of knowl-
edge and rights of indigenous peoples and local com-
munities as well as full and effective participation of
relevant stakeholders, in particular indigenous peoples
and local communities. In practice, however, there are
numerous accounts of cases where these have been
paid lip service to, at best (e.g., Refs 84,86,90).
Allocation
Finally, we consider the just (or injust) allocation of
climate-related responsibilities and ﬁnancial compen-
sations, including the emerging norm of loss and
damage.91 The principle of common but differenti-
ated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in
particular historical responsibility, has perhaps been
the most signiﬁcant underlying principle of the inter-
national climate regime. After the long era of rigid
differentiation of countries according to their status
as an Annex I or non-Annex I country (which fea-
tured a number of anomalies), the Paris Agreement
has blurred this divide and instead refocused atten-
tion on levels of ambition and willingness to act on
the part of states. It has granted non-state actors
roles in reviewing the ambition of countries’ NDCs,
thereby blurring the divide between state and non-
state actors also.92
The just allocation of climate ﬁnance, to both
states faced with disaster relief and adaptation needs
and non-state actors as capable partners in the deliv-
ery of relief and adaptation, is another area that will
likely see further hybridization of climate governance
post-Paris. Having promised the generation of
100 billion USD in annual ﬂows to developing coun-
tries in need, the international community is faced
with the challenge of mobilizing additional private
ﬁnance, and bridging public–private investments, as
well.93 All three pillars of Article 2 of the Paris
Agreement—mitigation, adaptation, and ﬁnance—
will therefore hardly be implementable unless non-
state actors are part of the various global, national,
and local level efforts.
Legitimacy
Legitimacy is a crucial element of any governance
system, determining whether actors ﬁnd rules accept-
able and rightful. Will non-state actors improve the
legitimacy of the Paris Agreement? If so, how? Here
we focus on participation, representation, and
accountability as key elements necessary to generate
legitimacy of the Paris Agreement in the eyes of dif-
ferent stakeholders (following work in the ﬁeld of
international political theory and international rela-
tions, these three values were chosen for their
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normative importance and susceptibility to rigorous
empirical analysis. For an example, see Ref 94).
Participation
Participation is a key element of legitimacy: it ensures
that stakeholders are given a say in how rules and reg-
ulations are formed. The Paris Agreement is predi-
cated on universal participation of states and broad
inclusion of non-state actors across both axes of its
hybrid structure.95 By turning up at COPs in huge
numbers as well as lobbying governments at home,
non-state actors had an impact on several key ele-
ments of the Paris Agreement including the laudable
(if problematic) 1.5 target (on why this target is laud-
able but likely unattainable, see Refs 96,97) as well as
the ‘loss and damage’ provision.98 There is also an
emerging literature on the importance of non-state
actors in global climate governance, focusing on how
domestic features (i.e., societal cleavages) condition
meaningful participation (see for instance Ref 99).
But here we want to highlight a normative con-
cern surrounding participation, especially in terms of
orchestration. The efforts of the UNFCCC and states
to bring non-state actors within the fold of formal
climate governance potentially undermine the con-
testatory potential of civil society.100 This criticism—
related to issues of agency above—brings to mind
Foucault’s notion of governmentality in which actors
are conditioned to work in service of governors, thus
depleting their critical potential. The literature on
non-state participation post-Paris has barely begun
to think through these kinds of normative ques-
tions.101 However one recent contribution by van
den Ven et al. to the post-Paris literature has begun
stressing that the evaluative tools for orchestration
by the UNFCCC on orchestration platforms (such as
those run by Ecofys) remains too narrow, focusing
on limited conceptions of ‘value’ and thus depriving
non-state actors of a broader range of participatory
goals.102 This mirrors problematic forms of knowl-
edge exclusion discussed in the justice section. Given
that non-state actors are increasingly brought into
the hybrid architecture through monitoring of state
NDCs and through orchestration efforts, both
scholars and practitioners should bear in mind the
importance of maintaining space for authentic delib-
eration and participation by non-state actors
(authentic deliberation implies a regulative ideal
important to gauge whether actors exchange justiﬁca-
tion under conditions of non-coercion. While never
fully attainable, governance arrangements can fall
closer or further from this ideal, and thus remains a
useful device for understanding how agents interact
and for providing a normative yardstick to judge
crucial element of legitimacy (uncoerced participa-
tion, meaningful representation, governmentality,
etc.). On the importance of deliberation in climate
governance, see Refs 103,104).
Representation
While efforts at orchestration might have the poten-
tial for near universal scope, it is of course impossible
for all stakeholders to participate directly in formal
multilateral negotiations. Within the UNFCCC this
puts the question of representation at the forefront
(for discussions in the lead-up to Paris see Ref 105).
Those who gain accreditation have to ‘make present’
that which is absent: the views, ideas, and preferences
of those they are supposed to represent. As non-state
actors have gained increasing inﬂuence in climate
negotiations (not to mention the impact of non-state
actors as private governors or in networks), the legiti-
macy of representational claims need to be scruti-
nized.106 This will be especially important in the
post-Paris hybrid context as NGOs, businesses, and
local governments will be asked to report on the
impact of NDCs. This reporting will necessarily have
to take consideration of how actors on the ground
are experiencing mitigation and adaptation efforts
(on the importance of representation in collective cli-
mate governance efforts see Ref 107). Representative
efforts will therefore need to be authentic—actually
embodying the views of affected stakeholders—if the
legitimacy of the Paris Agreement is to be main-
tained.108 This follows closely from the questions of
agency and access above, in which the lived experi-
ence of those peoples ‘on the ground’ need to be
given due consideration. Without authentic
(i.e., accurate and faithful) attempts at representation
in hybrid multilateralism by non- and substate actors,
justice and legitimacy will suffer.109
Yet evaluating the authenticity of representa-
tional efforts is tricky business. And here we see an
unfortunate ﬁssure opening up between empirical
studies of representation—especially in the climate
ﬁeld—and political theory. Work in political theory
now routinely recognizes that representation is a
two-way process: not only do representatives reﬂect
the views of those they claim to represent, but they
are also essential in ‘constructing’ those views.110
This complicates democratic notions of legitimate
representation because the representative is no longer
purely responsive to the represented, but actually
shapes the represented wants. In the ﬁeld of climate
governance, we know of no study that takes this con-
structivist view of representation seriously. Yet ﬁnd-
ing ways to determine whether representative claims
are authentic will prove vital for legitimacy.111 This
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is especially true moving into the post-Paris period in
which non-state actors play varied roles, such as
monitoring NDCs, lobbying governments at the
COPs, and partaking in orchestration efforts as both
intermediary and target.
Accountability
While participation and representation are critical,
they most directly related to legitimacy when coupled
with accountability: participating stakeholders—and
their representatives—need to hold those who make
decisions accountable. And alongside transparency
(discussed below), accountability has become a cen-
tral theme of discussions surrounding the hybrid
Paris Agreement along both axes.112 On one hand,
the implementation of NDCs will require states to be
accountable to the commitments they make. This, as
we have outlined, will require non-state actors to
monitor, verify, and report on implementation
efforts—highlighting the linkage between legitimacy
efforts and effectiveness. But it also means that non-
state actors will need to actively hold states to
account through naming-and-shaming efforts
between global stocktakes as well as at COPs (as we
see currently with CAN’s ‘Fossil of the Day’ awards).
However, this watchdog role will be complicated
until a transparency framework is in place and there
is some convergence on how states should report
NDCs.113 We should also be wary that this watch-
dog function increases the likelihood of
governmentality—that non-state actors are used in
service of government functions.
It is in relation to orchestration, however, that
efforts at accountability are more difﬁcult to conceptu-
alize. Orchestration, as a mode of governance,
employs soft forms of steering by an orchestrator to
mobilize intermediaries in order to inﬂuence targets.
This lack of principal-agent dynamic muddles
accountability relationships: who is setting goals in
orchestration efforts?67 Who is responsible for verify-
ing that rules are implemented to reach those goals?114
Who is responsible for ensuring that targets actually
live up to their commitments? This last question inter-
sects with debates over how accountable non-state
actors need to be themselves, and to whom.115
Just as importantly, though, the proliferation of
orchestration efforts by the UNFCCC and other
actors runs the risk of undermining accountability
even further: if the same actor can pledge a climate
effort to multiple orchestration efforts, how do we
avoid double-counting? Will states end up counting
multiple commitments within their NDCs? The emer-
gence of orchestration efforts such as NAZCA,
LPAA, the GCAA as well as those by other IOs (the
UN Secretary General, the World Bank, HLPF) and
subnational bodies raises serious accountability
issues. Several pieces in the post-Paris period have
begun noting how a lack of data from these orches-
tration initiatives will hamper accountability.116,117
These difﬁculties will in turn increase the importance
of non-state actors in orchestration as watchdogs of
these various portals. For instance, the Carbonn Cli-
mate Registry, the CDP, the Covenant of Mayors,
and many others will monitor and evaluate orches-
tration efforts. Given that the contributions of non-
state actors through orchestration portals and other
cooperative initiatives is often said to be necessary to
close an emission gap in the Paris Agreement, main-
taining accountability will be vital to the legitimacy
and effectiveness of the Paris Agreement. This should
entail accountability of both the orchestrator (to set
up and maintain portals with quantiﬁable and com-
parable information to help avoid double counting)
and accountability of targets (to ensure they make
efforts to live up to their commitments). Through the
GCAA the High-Level Champions have begun to
gather state and non-state submissions on how this
accountability could be strengthened in practice.
Finding the balance between more orchestrated con-
tributions (needed to tackle global warming), on one
hand, and the ability to monitor said contributions
through accountability mechanisms (needed for effec-
tive action) on the other, will prove paramount under
hybrid conditions.
Effectiveness
Whether non-state actors’ participation enhances or
impedes the effectiveness of the Paris agreement is a
third crucial element in viewing the signiﬁcance of
non-state activity. Effectiveness of an international
agreement can be deﬁned as the function of the
ambition and stringency of Parties’ commitments in
combination with the levels of state’s participation
and their compliance with what has been agreed.
Greater stringency of Parties’ obligations increases
effectiveness only to the extent it is not hampering
participation or compliance to a greater proportion.
Likewise, if ambitions are attenuated, greater partic-
ipation may not improve the effectiveness.4 For
example, in a study of the 1991 Paris Principles on
the Design of National Human Rights Institutions,
Linos and Pegram show that having noncommittal
language weakened efforts in the compliance phase,
in particular in authoritarian states.118 The weak
legal character of the Paris Agreement could lack
effectiveness in the absence of strong instruments of
compliance—one element of the effectiveness
WIREs Climate Change Non-state actors in hybrid global climate governance
Volume 9, January/February 2018 © 2017 The Authors. WIREs Climate Change published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. 11 of 18
identity. On the other hand, the hybrid agreement
may have spurred ambition and participation, the
other two elements of the identity. In this section,
we discuss how the literature has addressed non-
state actor effectiveness in relation to transparency,
compliance and outcomes.
Transparency
The Paris Agreement includes a mechanism for scal-
ing up Parties’ contributions beyond the ﬁrst 5-year
period starting 2020. The ﬁrst round of NDCs will
be reviewed and new and more ambitious contribu-
tions will be encouraged. A facilitative dialogue shall
explore possibilities to enhance effort to fulﬁll the
Paris Agreement, including how information that is
necessary for clarity, transparency, and understand-
ing countries contributions can be enhanced. This is
an area where non-state actors are expected to pro-
vide important contributions.
The transparency framework is a core feature
of the Paris Agreement.119 It shall provide a ‘clear
understanding of climate change actions.’ This
includes clarity and tracking of progress on both
mitigation and adaptation contributions, including
‘good practices, priorities, need and gaps’ (Article
13.5). More speciﬁc roles for non-state engagement
are laid out in the context of ‘Enhanced action prior
to 2020.’ Parties are encouraged to cooperate with
non-state actors in technical examination processes,
which include sharing experiences and suggestions in
addition to facilitating implementation. Non-state
actors are expected to show-case the large-scale
momentum of an on-going change, for example, reg-
istering new and updated initiatives on the NAZCA
platform.59,70
The LPAA independent assessment report—
Galvanizing the Groundswell of Climate Actions—
concludes that the process has been ‘highly effective
at mobilizing initiatives, and giving them increased
visibility and enhanced recognition.’ This foundation,
the report argues, ensures that the supportive func-
tion of non-state actors will remain after COP21.
‘Elements of such supportive environment would
include a system to track progress of climate initia-
tives, an increased focus on underrepresented action
areas, and greater recognition to initiatives that are
not yet recognized, especially those pertaining to
adaptation’ (p. 25).120 Contributing to the transpar-
ency framework would be an important contribution
to a fundamental part of the Paris Agreement. Based
on pre-Paris agreement literature, this is a function
that non-state actors can be expected to assume
through a range of governance functions, such as
shaping rules, principles and norms, providing
information, capacity building, mobilizing public
engagement, representing public opinion and includ-
ing marginalized voices, in addition to the evaluation
and monitoring of compliance.
Compliance
As part of the transparency framework, the Paris
Agreement involves global stocktaking events every
5 years starting in 2023, where progress of compli-
ance is assessed. However, how progress shall be
assessed—in particular in relation to the vast ﬂora
of non-state contributions—remains a challenge.
One example from the lessons from a prominent cli-
mate instrument—REDD+—illustrates the implica-
tions. Its objectives—to reduce deforestation and
forest degradation while safeguarding conservation,
sustainable management of forests, and enhancing
forest carbon stocks in developing countries—is
now enshrined in the Paris Agreement’s Article
5. The REDD+ case reveals diverging views of
means of effectiveness. Donor countries understood
the aim to enhancing transparency about existing
actions and ﬁnances, thus identifying gaps and
needs. The Coalition of Rainforest Nations, on the
other hand, maintained the scaling up actions and
ﬁnance meant delivering direct increase of funding
(Gupta et al. conclude that REDD+ as a PPP has
delivered in terms of transparency, participation,
and knowledge sharing and coordination, but it has
not been able to fulﬁll the ofﬁcial aims of scaling up
neither actions nor ﬁnance).121
Differences in views on what contribution to
compliance entails is one challenge. Another is how
it shall be measured. Chan et al. argue: ‘it is not very
likely that the organizers of the high-level event
would have the capacity to comparatively assess the
performance of an extraordinarily large and growing
set of non-State actions.’122 These authors conclude
that demonstrating the contribution of non-state
actions at the stocktaking events and Technical
Examination Processes can be biased in the selection
of cases. Thus, the assessment of non-state contribu-
tion to compliance at present and its potential for
future actions may be skewed. In particular if it
remains unclear how progress shall be assessed, what
type of non-state contributions are to be included,
and which metrics shall be used for these actions.
The hybrid architecture of Paris does not provide
clear guidance on this challenge, but the next few
years of interactions between states and non-state
actors will determine what is being measured
and how.
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Outcomes
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s
ﬁfth assessment report distinguishes between three
forms of effectiveness: economic effectiveness, cost
effectiveness and environmental effectiveness. All
three address the environmental outcomes policies
and institutions. Environmental effectiveness refers to
‘whether policies achieve intended goals in reducing
emissions or other pressures on the environment or
in improving measured environmental quality,’
whereas economic effectiveness is used to capture
‘the impact of policies on the overall economy.’ Cost
effectiveness, which is included in economic effective-
ness refers to ‘the principle of attaining a given level
of environmental performance at lowest aggregate
cost.’123 The literature on the effectiveness of non-
state participation in climate governance often refers
to environmental effectiveness. This could be
achieved by contributing to concrete emission reduc-
tions.6,21 Other motives for non-state contributions
could be cost effectiveness by taking on monitoring
tasks otherwise performed by government agencies
or complement the public funding in climate ﬁnance
to deliver the committed annual 100 US billion93 or
other adaptation ﬁnance.113 Further, they can
achieve economic effectiveness, for example, by
involving businesses and cities in greening the
economy.
Not only are non-state actors being asked to
help monitor others, to spur cost effectiveness, from a
state perspective, they are also asked to raise ﬁnance
and implement changes themselves. The Paris Agree-
ment addresses a number of mitigation, adaptation,
ﬁnance, and sustainable development objectives. So
while non-state actions are expected to contribute to
the reduction of greenhouse gases, enhancing adapta-
tion, and raising ﬁnance, the Paris Agreement also sets
out to ‘strengthen the global response to the threat of
climate change, in the context of sustainable develop-
ment and efforts to eradicate poverty’ (Article 2).5
In the lead up to Paris, Blok et al. argued that
21 major initiatives involving a wide range of non-
state actors would have the capacity to spur
greenhouse-gas emission reductions at the scale of
10 gigatonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent by 2020.
Such contributions, including emission reduction of
the top 1000 companies, supply-chain emission
reductions, actions by green ﬁnancial institutions,
major cities initiative and subnational governments
as well as voluntary-offset companies and consumers,
would put the world on track of limiting global tem-
perature increase to 2C above preindustrial levels,
according to the authors.124 The high expectations
on non-state actors remain, although some concerns
have been raised that relying on non-state initiatives
may provide states with an excuse to shy away from
responsibility.59,70
However, there is little systematic research on
the outcome performance of organized non-state and
subnational contributions to international efforts.
Chan et al. analyzed 25 out of 52 climate actions in
both developed and developing countries that were
launched at a premeeting to Paris: the 2014 UN Cli-
mate Summit in New York. It was the ﬁrst major ini-
tiative to formalize the non-state contribution to the
Paris process. They assessed to what extent the pro-
duction of outputs 1 year after were likely to deliver
expected social and environmental impacts. The
authors concluded that the output performance is
higher than expected after 1 year compared to stud-
ies of similar actions at the World Summit for Sus-
tainable Development in 2002.
Yet, they found varieties between policy areas.
For example, energy actions had been fulﬁlled to a
greater extent than actions for creating resilience.
Partly, this may be explained by the actions aiming
at enhancing resilience were in fact launched in con-
junction to the meeting, whereas energy actions draw
on ongoing initiatives and existing competences
within participating organizations. 122
Nevertheless, it points at the importance of
distinguishing between the different goals of the
Paris Agreement when assessing effectiveness of
non-state actions. Chan et al. ask if actions related
to resilience may take longer time or encounter
more obstacles. Also, the effectiveness of initiatives
in the energy sector may appear high, whereas it in
fact has been initiated long before it was packaged
as a new initiative. They also found substantial dis-
parities between performance in developing and
developed countries: ‘While many actions target
low-income and lower-middle-income economies,
the implementation gap in these countries remains
greater’ compared to OECD countries.122 This high-
lights a core issue for the means of effectiveness of
climate actions. Although there are few systematic
empirical studies, they point to a clear connection
between high performance and access to ﬁnancial
and organizational capacity.120 About half of the
New York meeting initiatives had sufﬁcient staff or
secretariats, budgets, work plans, and monitoring
capability.122 Yet a substantial part lacked the criti-
cal capacity, including many of the arrangements
that carried on since COP 20. If the lack of the nec-
essary organizational features in many of the non-
state initiatives persists, it may hamper many of the
Post-Paris contributions.120
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CONCLUSION
This article has had three objectives. First, we have
documented the myriad roles non-state actors have
played in global climate governance leading up to,
and in the aftermath of, the Paris Agreement. Under-
standing past roles will be important in assessing
both potentialities and progress in non-state actor
activity as we move in to the post-Paris period.
Second, we have argued that the Paris Agree-
ment embodies a ‘hybrid architecture’ that amalgam-
ates together state and non-state interactions. This
term is becoming commonplace in the post-Paris lit-
erature, and we have provided much-needed speciﬁc-
ity by unpacking the hybrid nature of the Agreement
across two axes. On one hand, a legal status of bind-
ing reviews in the protocol is counterpointed by non-
binding state NDCs. However, these commitments
are underpinned by both binding and nonbinding
decisions also on substate level. On the other, the
orchestration efforts of the UNFCCC are directed at
(and often met by) a groundswell of climate decisions
as well as implementation efforts by both state and
substate actors. Across both axes non-state actors
have come, and will continue, to play increasingly
important roles. Undertaking a meta-review of the
post-Paris literature, we have systematized and docu-
mented these changes in terms of how non-state
actors will inﬂuence the justice, legitimacy, and effec-
tiveness of the Paris Agreement.
Finally, this review leaves us with some
important conclusions. While the pre-Paris litera-
ture on non-state actors often focused on whether
non-state actors could affect intergovernmental
relations, the debate will now focus on how—and
under what conditions—non-state actors matter. In
light of this, the interrelationships between justice,
legitimacy, and effectiveness—touched upon in this
review—will become more salient. Questions of
justice—such as access—bear heavily upon legiti-
macy. Likewise inclusion in decision making has
been shown to increase compliance. Finally, effec-
tiveness is crucial for (some considerations of ) jus-
tice by providing the agreed outcome. These are
just a few of the ways in which justice, legitimacy,
and effectiveness intersect. As the post-Paris litera-
ture unfolds, unpacking these trade-offs and
symbioses—especially in the complex hybrid archi-
tecture ingrained in the Paris Agreement—will be
imperative as we seek to meet the ambition goals
necessary for tackling climate change.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We would like to thank the Swedish Research Council Formas for partly funding the research through the pro-
ject ‘A Global Potluck: Cross-national patterns of state engagement and performance in the new landscape of
international climate cooperation’ (Grant No 2011-779) and Riksbanken Jubileumsfond project ‘Beyond grid-
lock in global governance: Democracy, politicization, and legitimacy’ (Project No P16-0242:1). We are also
grateful for two anonymous reviewers and the editors of WIREs Climate Change for very valuable suggestions.
REFERENCES
1. Okereke C, Bulkeley H, Schroeder H. Conceptualiz-
ing climate governance beyond the international
regime. Global Environ Polit 2009, 9:58–78.
2. Hoffmann MJ. Climate Governance at the Cross-
roads: Experimenting with a Global Response after
Kyoto. New York: Oxford University Press; 2011.
3. Van Asselt H. The role of non-state actors in review-
ing ambition, implementation, and compliance under
the Paris agreement. Clim Law 2016, 6:91–108.
4. Bäckstrand K, Kuyper J, Linnér BO, Lövbrand E.
Non-state actors in global climate governance: from
Copenhagen to Paris and beyond. Environ Polit
2017, 26:561–579.
5. UNFCCC. Decision 1/CP.21: adoption of the Paris
Agreement, FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 [Internet]. In:
UNFCCC. Report of the Conference of the Parties on
Its Twenty-First Session: Part two: Action Taken by
the Conference of the Parties at Its Twenty-First Ses-
sion, Paris, 30 November–13 December, 2015. Avail-
able at: https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/
eng/l09r01.pdf. (Accessed March 23, 2017)
6. Hale T. “All hands on deck”: the Paris Agreement
and non-state climate action. Global Environ Polit
2016, 16:12–22.
7. Fung A. Varieties of participation in complex gover-
nance. Public Adm Rev 2006, 66:66–75.
8. Biermann F, Gupta A. Accountability and legitimacy
in earth system governance: a research framework.
Ecol Econ 2011, 70:1856–1864.
9. Stroup SS, Wong WH. The agency and authority of
international NGOs. Perspect Polit 2016,
14:138–144.
Advanced Review wires.wiley.com/climatechange
14 of 18 © 2017 The Authors. WIREs Climate Change published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Volume 9, January/February 2018
10. Tallberg J, Sommerer T, Squatrito T, Jönsson C.
Explaining the transnational design of international
organizations. Int Org 2014, 68:741–774.
11. Keohane RO, Victor DG. The regime complex for cli-
mate change. Perspect Polit 2011, 9:7–23.
12. Abbott KW. Strengthening the transnational regime
complex for climate change. Transnatl Environ Law
2014, 3:57–88.
13. Nasiritousi N, Hjerpe M, Linnér BO. The roles of
non-state actors in climate change governance: under-
standing agency through governance proﬁles. Int
Environ Agreements 2016, 16:109–126.
14. Tallberg J, Sommerer T, Squatrito T, Jönsson C. The
Opening Up of International Organizations.
New York: Cambridge University Press; 2013.
316 pp.
15. Steffek J. Explaining cooperation between IGOs and
NGOs-push factors, pull factors, and the policy cycle.
Rev Int Stud 2013, 39:993–1013.
16. Nasiritousi N, Linnér BO. Open or closed meetings?
Explaining non-state actor involvement in the interna-
tional climate change negotiations. Int Environ
Agreements 2016, 16:127–144.
17. Nordhaus W. Climate clubs: overcoming free-riding
in international climate policy. Am Econ Rev 2015,
105, 4:1339–1370.
18. Widerberg O, Stenson DE. Climate clubs and the
UNFCCC. Stockholm, Sweden: FORES. FORES
Study; 2013.
19. Abbott KW, Snidal D. Strengthening international
regulation through transmittal new governance: over-
coming the orchestration deﬁcit. Vand J Transnatl
Law 2009, 42:501–578.
20. Abbott KW, Genschel P, Snidal D, Zangl B. Two
logics of indirect governance: delegation and orches-
tration. Br J Polit Sci 2015, 46:719–729.
21. Chan S, Asselt H, Hale T, Abbott KW, Beisheim M,
Hoffmann M, Guy B, Höhne N, Hsu A, Pattberg P,
et al. Reinvigorating international climate policy: a
comprehensive framework for effective non-state
action. Global Policy 2015, 6:466–473.
22. Abbott KW, Bernstein S. The high-level political
forum on sustainable development: orchestration by
default and design. Global Policy 2015, 6:222–233.
23. Johnson C, Johnson D. The orchestration of global
urban climate governance: conducting power in the
post-Paris climate regime. Environ Polit 2017,
26:694–714.
24. Henriksen L, Ponte S. Public orchestration, social net-
works, and transnational environmental governance:
lessons from the aviation industry. Reg Gov. In press.
https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12151.
25. UNFCCC. Subsidiary body for implementation [Inter-
net], FCCC/SBI/2011/L.19, Bonn, 6–16 June, 2011.
Available at: http://unfccc.int/meetings/bonn_jun_
2011/session/6376/php/view/documents.php. (Accessed
August 18, 2007).
26. Haas PM. Obtaining international environmental
protection through epistemic consensus. Millennium
2016, 19:347–363.
27. Bäckstrand K. Accountability of networked climate
governance: the rise of transnational climate partner-
ships. Global Environ Polit 2008, 8:74–102.
28. Pattberg P. What role for private rule-making in
global environmental governance? Analysing the For-
est Stewardship Council (FSC). Int Environ Agree-
ments 2005, 5:175–189.
29. Auld G. Constructing private governance: the rise
and evolution of forest, coffee, and ﬁsheries certiﬁca-
tion. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press; 2014.
352 pp.
30. Green JF. Rethinking Private Authority: Agents and
Entrepreneurs in Global Environmental Governance.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; 2013.
232 pp.
31. Della Porta D, Tarrow S. Transnational Protest and
Global Activism. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Little-
ﬁeld Publishers; 2004. 304 pp.
32. Fisher DR. COP-15 in Copenhagen: how the merging
of movements left civil society out in the cold. Global
Environ Polit 2010, 10:11–17.
33. Phipps C, Vaughan A, Milman O. Global Climate
March 2015: Hundreds of Thousands March Around
the World—As It Happened. Sydney, London,
New York: The Guardian; 2015. Updated Deceember
1, 2015. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/
environment/live/2015/nov/29/global-peoples-climate-
change-march-2015-day-of-action-live. (Accessed
March 17, 2017)
34. Christoff P. The promissory note: COP 21 and the
Paris Climate Agreement. Environ Polit 2016,
25:765–787.
35. The Peoples Climate Movement. Peoples Climate
Movement [Internet]. Available at: https://
peoplesclimate.org/.(Accessed March 18, 2017)
36. Schroeder H, Boykoff M, Spiers L. Equity and state
representations in climate negotiations. Nat Clim
Change 2012, 2:834–836.
37. Böhmelt T, Koubi V, Bernauer T. Civil society partici-
pation in global governance: insights from climate
politics. Eur J Polit Res 2013, 53:18–36.
38. Kruse J. Women’s representation in the UN climate
change negotiations: a quantitative analysis of state
delegations, 1995-2011. Int Environ Agreements
2014, 14:349–370.
39. Depledge J. Climate Change Negotiations. Earthscan
Canada: Toronto, Canada; 2005. 258 pp.
40. UNFCCC. UNFCCC/CP/2015/INF.3 [Internet]. In:
Conference of the Parties 21st Session: List of partici-
pants, Paris, 30 November–11 December, 2015.
WIREs Climate Change Non-state actors in hybrid global climate governance
Volume 9, January/February 2018 © 2017 The Authors. WIREs Climate Change published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. 15 of 18
Available at: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/
cop21/eng/inf03p01.pdf. (Accessed March 18, 2017).
41. Hjerpe M, Linnér B-O. Functions of COP side events
in climate change governance. Clim Policy 2010,
10:167–180.
42. Böhmelt T. Civil society lobbying and countries’ cli-
mate change policies: a matching approach. Clim Pol-
icy 2013, 13:698–717.
43. Schroeder H, Lovell H. The role of non-nation-state
actors and side events in the international climate
negotiations. Clim Policy 2012, 12:23–37.
44. Paoletto G, Schroeder H. Enhancing Participation of
NGOs in the FCCC Process. GEIC Paper Series.
Tokyo, Japan: Global Environment Information Cen-
ter; 1997.
45. Susskind LE. Environmental Diplomacy: Negotiating
More Effective Global Agreements. Oxford, UK:
Oxford University Press; 1994.
46. Betsill MM. NGOs. In: Bäckstrand K, Lövbrand E,
eds. Research Handbook on Climate Governance.
Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar; 2015, 251–261.
47. Nasiritousi N. Shapers, brokers and doers: the
dynamic roles of non-state actors in global climate
change governance. PhD Thesis, Linköping Univer-
sity, 2016.
48. Victor D. Plan B for Copenhagen. Nature 2009,
461:342–344.
49. Eckersley R. Moving forward in the climate negotia-
tions: multilateralism or minilateralism? Global Envi-
ron Polit 2012, 12:24–42.
50. Levin K, Cashore B, Bernstein S, Auld G. Overcoming
the tragedy of super wicked problems: constraining
our future selves to ameliorate global climate change.
Policy Sci 2012, 45:123–152.
51. Roberts D. A way to win the climate ﬁght? [Internet]
The American Prospect. May 10, 2011. Available at:
http://prospect.org/article/way-win-climate-ﬁght.
(Accessed July 22, 2017)
52. Falkner R. A minilateral solution for global climate
change? On bargaining efﬁciency, club beneﬁts, and
international legitimacy. Pers Polit 2016, 14:87–101.
53. Hjerpe M, Nasiritousi N. Views on alternative forums
for effectively tackling climate change. Nat Clim
Change 2015, 5:864–867.
54. Keohane RO, Victor DG. Cooperation and discord in
global climate policy. Nat Clim Change 2016,
6:570–575.
55. Kemp L. Better out than in. Nat Clim Change 2017,
7:458–460.
56. Rockström J, Schellnhuber HJ, Hoskins B,
Ramanathan V, Schlosser P, Brasseur GP, Gaffney O,
Nobre C, Meinshausen M, Rogelj J, et al. The
world’s biggest gamble. Earth’s Future 2016,
4:465–470.
57. Van Asselt H, Hale T, Doelle M, Abeysinghe A,
Milkoreit M, Prolo C, Rudyk B. Maximizing the
potential of the Paris Agreement: effective review of
action and support in a bottom-up regime. 2016.
4 pp. Available at: https://www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/sites/
www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/ﬁles/documents/Paris_Agreement_
Review_Discussion_Brief_170516.pdf. (Accessed
March 18, 2017)
58. Bodansky D, Diringer E. Alternative models for the
2015 climate change agreement. FNI Clim Policy Per-
spect 2014, 13:1–8.
59. Dimitrov RS. The Paris Agreement on climate change:
behind closed doors. Global Environ Polit 2016,
16:1–11.
60. Stua MA, ed. Hybrid model to govern the mitigation
alliance. In: From the Paris Agreement to a Low-
Carbon Bretton Woods Rationale for the Establish-
ment of a Mitigation Alliance. Cham, Switzerland:
Springer International Publishing; 2017, 133–171.
61. Bäckstrand K, Kuyper J, Linnér BO, Lövbrand E.
Non-state actors in global climate governance: from
Copenhagen to Paris and beyond. Environ Polit
2017, 26:561–579.
62. Matland RE. Synthesizing the implementation litera-
ture: the ambiguity-conﬂict model of policy imple-
mentation. J Public Admin Res Theory 1995,
5:145–174.
63. Clémençon R. The two sides of the Paris Agreement:
dismal failure or historic breakthrough? J Environ
Dev 2016, 25:3–24.
64. Martini C. Transparency: The backbone of the Paris
Agreement [Internet]. New Haven, CT: Yale Univer-
sity; 2016. Available at: http://envirocenter.yale.edu/
transparency-the-backbone-of-the-Paris-Agreement.
(Accessed March 18, 2017).
65. Duyck S. MRV in the 2015 climate agreement-
promoting compliance through transparency and the
participation of NGOs. Carbon Clim Law Rev 2014,
8:175–187.
66. Van Asselt H. Putting the ‘enhanced transparency
framework’ into action: Priorities for a key pillar of
the Paris Agreement [Internet]. Oxford: Stockholm
Environment Institute (SEI). 2016.Available at:
https://www.sei-international.org/mediamanager/
documents/Publications/Climate/SEI-PB-2016-
Transparency-under-Paris-Agreement.pdf. (Accessed
March 12, 2017)
67. Bäckstrand K, Kuyper J. The democratic legitimacy
of orchestration: the UNFCCC, non-state actors, and
transnational climate governance. Environ Polit
2017, 26:764–788.
68. Hale T, Roger C. Orchestration and transnational cli-
mate governance. Rev Int Org 2014 Mar, 9:59–82.
69. UNFCC. Invitation For submissions on the road map
for global climate action [Internet]. 2016. Available
at: http://newsroom.unfccc.int/media/658506/high-
Advanced Review wires.wiley.com/climatechange
16 of 18 © 2017 The Authors. WIREs Climate Change published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Volume 9, January/February 2018
level-champions-invitation-submissions.pdf. (Accessed
July 24, 2017)
70. Chan S, Brandi C, Bauer S. Aligning transnational cli-
mate action with international climate governance:
the road from Paris. Rev Eur Comp Int Environ Law
2016, 25:238–247.
71. Keohane RO, Oppenheimer M. Paris: beyond the cli-
mate dead end through pledge and review? Polit Gov
2016, 4:142–151.
72. Jacobs M. High pressure for low emissions: how civil
society created the Paris climate agreement. Juncture
2016, 22:314–323.
73. Roger C, Hale T, Andonova L. The comparative poli-
tics of transnational climate governance. Int Interact
2017, 43:1–25.
74. Gupta A, Mason M. Disclosing or obscuring? The
politics of transparency in global climate governance.
Curr Opin Environ Sustain 2016, 18:82–90.
75. Glover A, Schroeder H. Legitimacy in REDD+ gover-
nance in Indonesia. Int Environ Agreements 2017,
17:695–708.
76. Sikor T, Càm H. REDD+ on the rocks? Conﬂict over
forest and politics of justice in Vietnam. Hum Ecol
2016, 44:217–227.
77. Schroeder H. Agency in international climate negotia-
tions: the case of indigenous peoples and avoided
deforestation. Int Environ Agreements 2010,
10:317–332.
78. Okereke C, Coventry P. Climate justice and the inter-
national regime: before, during, and after Paris.
WIREs Clim Change 2016, 7:834–851.
79. Klinsky S, Roberts T, Huq S, Okereke C, Newell P,
Dauvergne P, O’Brien K, Schroeder H, Tschakert P,
Clapp J, et al. Why equity is fundamental in climate
change policy research. Global Environ Change
2017, 44:170–173 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
gloenvhca.201.6.08.002.
80. Biermann F, Betsill M, Gupta J, Kanie N, Lebel L,
Liverman D, Schroeder H Siebenhuener B. Earth Sys-
tem Governance: People, Places, and the Planet, Sci-
ence and Implementation Plan of the Earth System
Governance Project. IHDP Report 20, Bonn,
IHDP, 2009
81. Lövbrand E, Linnér BO. Governing beyond or with
the state? State conceptions in studies on non-state
climate action. In: Kronsell A, Bäckstrand K, eds.
Rethinking the State: Environmental Governance
Towards Climate and Sustainability Transitions.
New York: Routledge; 2016, 43–62.
82. Newell P, Pattberg P, Schroeder H. Multiactor gover-
nance and environment. Annu Rev Environ Resour
2012, 37:365–387.
83. Dehm J. Indigenous peoples and REDD+ safeguards:
rights as resistance or as disciplinary inclusion in the
green economy? J Hum Rights Environ 2016,
7:170–217.
84. Bayrak MM, Marafa LM. Ten years of REDD+: a
critical review of the impact of REDD+ on forest-
dependent communities. Sustainability 2016, 8:1–22.
85. Dunlop T, Corbera E. Incentivizing REDD+: how
developing countries are laying the groundwork for
beneﬁt-sharing. Environ Sci Policy 2016, 63:44–54.
86. McDermott CL, Ituarte-Lima C. Safeguarding what
and for whom? The role of institutional ﬁt in shaping
REDD+ in Mexico. Ecol Soc 2016, 21:9.
87. Bäckstrand K, Lövbrand E, eds. Research Handbook
on Climate Governance. Cheltenham, UK: Edward
Elgar; 2015, 640.
88. Bäckstrand K, Lövbrand E. The Road to Paris: con-
tending climate governance discourses in the post-
Copenhagen era. J Environ Policy Plan. In press.
https://doi.org/10.1080/152390X.2016.1.
89. Robinson CJ, Maclean K, Hill R, Bock E, Rist P. Par-
ticipatory mapping to negotiate indigenous knowl-
edge used to assess environmental risk. Sustain Sci
2016, 11:115–126.
90. Suiseeya K. Transforming justice in REDD+ through
a politics of difference approach. Forests
2016, 7:300.
91. Vanhala L, Hestbaek C. Framing climate change loss
and damage in UNFCCC negotiations. Global Envi-
ron Polit 2016, 16:111–129.
92. Bäckstrand K, Lövbrand E, eds. Research handbook
on climate governance. Cheltenham, UK: Edward
Elgar; 2015. 640 pp.
93. Fridahl M, Linnér BO. Perspectives on the green cli-
mate fund: possible compromises on capitalization
and balanced allocation. Clim Dev 2016, 8:105–109.
94. Bexell M, Tallberg J, Uhlin A. Democracy in global
governance: the promises and pitfalls of transnational
actors. Global Gov 2010, 16:81–101.
95. Brun A. Conference diplomacy: the making of the
Paris Agreement. Policy Gov 2016, 4:115–123.
96. Hulme M. 1.5C and climate research after the Paris
Agreement. Nat Clim Change 2016, 6:222–224.
97. Peters GP. The ’best available science’ to inform
1.5C policy choices. Nat Clim Change 2016,
6:646–649.
98. Allen J, Hadden J. Exploring the framing power of
NGOs in global climate politics. Environ Polit 2017,
26:738–763.
99. Bechtel M, Genovese F, Scheve K. Interests, norms
and support for the provision of global public goods:
the case of climate co-operation. Br J Polit Sci. In
press. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123417000205.
100. Dryzek JS. Global civil society: the progress of post-
Westphalian politics. Annu Rev Polit Sci 2012,
15:101–119.
WIREs Climate Change Non-state actors in hybrid global climate governance
Volume 9, January/February 2018 © 2017 The Authors. WIREs Climate Change published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. 17 of 18
101. exception F a, see Dryzek JS. The meanings of life for
non-state actors in climate politics. Environ Polit
2017, 26:789–799.
102. Van der Ven H, Bernstein S, Hoffmann M. Valuing
the contributions of non-state and subnational actors
to climate governance. Global Environ Polit 2017,
17:1–20.
103. Bäckstrand K. Democratizing global environmental
governance? Stakeholder democracy after the World
Summit on Sustainable Development. Eur J of Int
Relat 2006, 12:467–498.
104. Stevenson H, Dryzek JS. Democratizing Global Cli-
mate Governance. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press; 2014.
105. Dombrowski K. Filling the gap? An analysis of non-
governmental organizations responses to participa-
tion and representation deﬁcits in global climate gov-
ernance. Int Environ Agreements 2010, 10:397–416.
106. Tomlinson L. Getting a seat at the table: fair partici-
pation in the UNFCCC. In: Procedural Justice in the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change: Negotiating Fairness. New York: Springer
International Publishing; 2015, 85–107.
107. Tosun J, Schoenefeld JJ. Collective climate action and
networked climate governance. WIREs Clim Change
2017, 8:1–17.
108. Saward M. The representative claim. Oxford, UK:
Oxford University Press; 2010, 218.
109. Okereke C, Coventry P. Climate justice and the inter-
national regime. WIREs Clim Change 2010,
1:462–474.
110. Disch L. Toward a mobilization conception of demo-
cratic representation. Am Polit Sci Rev 2011,
105:100–114.
111. Kuyper JW. Systemic representation: democracy,
deliberation, and nonelectoral representatives. Am
Polit Sci Rev 2016, 110:308–324.
112. Widerberg O, Pattberg P. Accountability challenges
in the transnational regime complex for climate
change. Rev Policy Res 2017, 34:68–87.
113. Lesnikowski A, Ford J, Biesbroek R, Berrang-Ford L,
Maillet M, Araos M, Austin SE. What does the Paris
Agreement mean for adaptation? Clim Policy 2017,
17:825–831.
114. Widerberg O, Pattberg P. International cooperative
initiatives in global climate governance: raising the
ambition level or delegitimizing the UNFCCC?
Global Policy 2015, 6:45–56.
115. Kuyper J, Bäckstrand K, Schroeder H. Institutional
accountability of non-state actors in the UNFCCC:
exit, voice, and loyalty. Rev Policy Res 2017,
34:88–109.
116. Michaelowa K, Michaelowa A. Transnational climate
governance initiatives: designed for effective climate
change mitigation? Int Interact 2016, 43:129–155.
117. Widerberg O, Stripple J. The expanding ﬁeld of coop-
erative initiatives for decarbonization: a review of ﬁve
databases. WIREs Clim Change 2016, 7:486–500.
118. Linos K, Pegram T. The language of compromise in
international agreements. Int Org 2016, 70:587–621.
119. Oberthür S. Reﬂections on global climate politics post
Paris: power, interests and polycentricity. Int Spect
2016, 51:80–94.
120. Squarespace. Galvanizing the groundswell of climate
actions. Lima-Paris action agenda independent assess-
ment report [Internet]. 2015. Available at: http://
static1.squarespace.com/static/
552be32ce4b0b269a4e2ef58/t/
56673b3cb204d59deb517d8d/1449605948836/
LPAA_Assessment_Report_7DEC15.pdf. (Accessed
March 23, 2017)
121. Gupta A, Pistorius T, Vijge MJ. Managing fragmen-
tation in global environmental governance: the
REDD+ Partnership as bridge organization. Int Envi-
ron Agreements 2016, 16:355–374.
122. Chan S, Falkner R, Goldberg M, van Asselt H. Effective
and geographically balanced? An output-based assess-
ment of non-state climate actions. Clim Policy. In press.
http://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2016.1248343
123. IPCC. In: Edenhofer O, Pichs-Madruga R, Sokona Y,
Minx JC, Farahani E, Kadner S, Seyboth K, Adler A,
Baum I, Brunner S, Eickemeier P, Kriemann B,
Savolainen J, Schlömer S, von Stechow C, Zwickel T,
eds. Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate
Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the
ﬁfth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge, UK: Cam-
bridge University Press; 2014.
124. Blok K, Hohne N, van der Leun K, Harrison N.
Bridging the greenhouse-gas emissions gap. Nat Clim
Change 2012, 2:471–474.
Advanced Review wires.wiley.com/climatechange
18 of 18 © 2017 The Authors. WIREs Climate Change published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Volume 9, January/February 2018
